In the period 2001-2004 two major reforms followed in Belgium: a personal income tax reform which included a new tax credit on low earnings (2001) and a reform of social security contributions for low wage employees (2004). Using a discrete hours labor supply model, this paper assesses the impact of these reforms on aggregate labor supply of couples. Results suggest that the reforms had a positive (but moderate) effect on both participation and hours worked. Targeted reductions in social security contributions, nevertheless, proved to be more effective in stimulating aggregate labour supply, whereas the tax credit had a stronger effect on participation.
INTRODUCTION
Low skilled workers typically show significantly lower employment rates. This holds in particular for Belgium, where, according to the 2001 Labour Force Survey, average employment rate lays at 60.3%, but drops at 39.4% for the low skilled, and at below 30% for low skilled females.
1 Several economic reasons have been put forward to explain the lower employment rates amongst the less skilled population. Technological change and globalisation are often cited as the two driving forces shaping the wage structure and the employment patterns. On the one hand, skill biased technological change may induce substitution effects between capital and low and (as is more and more the case) medium skilled labour. On the other hand, less skilled workers are relatively more penalised by the increased competitive pressure stemming from globalisation (Moore and Ranjan, 2005) .
High labour costs and strict labour protection legislation are also blamed for having a particularly negative effect on the labour demand for low skilled (Layard and Nickell, 1999) . Recent years, nevertheless, have witnessed an increasing concern towards supply factors. The combination of access to out of work income and the high taxes and contribution rates paid on gross earnings typically lead to small financial incentives to take up work.
Starting from 1999, the low Belgian employment rates have been tackled with supply side policies. 2 The first measure was a subsidy on low wage employees' social security contributions (SSC) and the abolition of the so called "crises surcharge", a temporary income tax that had been introduced during the tough budgetary crisis of the early 90s. But in 2001, the Belgian parliament voted an extensive tax reform which reduced the total burden of personal income tax by over 10%. 2004 also witnessed a new amendment of the tax system with an extension of the subsidy on low wage employees' SSC.
These reforms follow similar measures introduced in the US and in the UK in the previous decades. Tax credits and in-work benefits like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and the Family Credit (FC) and its successors (i.e. the WFTC and more recently the WTC) 3 IS BELGIUM "MAKING WORK PAY"? 1 Low skilled individuals correspond to ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) levels 0, 1 or 2, i.e. no education, primary school or lower secondary education. 2 Traditionally, employment policy in Belgium has focused on demand side measures, probably due to the high level of structural unemployment, mainly linked to the heavy industrial restructuring process. The reduction of employers' Social Security Contributions (SSC) for low paid workers has been promoted as early as 1988 by a group of economists known as 'the group of the seventy-two' as a means to increase low skilled employment. At that time the proposed reduction was in the order of 22,500 BEF per year, i.e. approximately 65 EUR per month in current values. Using the macro-model HERMES, Van der Linden (1991) estimated that such reform would have reduced unemployment by around 25,000 units. SSC reductions have indeed characterized most of the 90s, first following a rather scattered pattern. Since 1994, however, the reduction of SSC has been generalized to all low paid workers. Using a demand driven aggregated model and reasonable hypotheses of labor demand elasticity, IMF economists (IMF, 2001) have estimated that the reduction in the tax wedge will bring about an increase in the employment rate of 1 percentage point, which is in line with previous estimations based on HERMES. 3 The FC has increased in its level and has been reformed in its structure in several steps. In the beginning of the decade the FC was changed to the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) and more recently the credit was replaced by a pure tax credit for low earners (Working Tax Credit) available to persons with and without children, while the Child Tax Credit was lumped together with the child benefits.
in the UK, have had a significant impact on the labour supply of low skilled workers and especially single mothers. At the same time, however, these policies aimed at "making work pay" have had negative effects on the employment of secondary earners (mostly females in married or cohabiting couples). The main reason for this effect is that the above instruments are means tested on household income, so that secondary earners face an incentive to reduce labour supply in order to enter the entitlement range. Several studies point at these opposing effects, using both ex-post methodologies based on "difference in differences" and ex-ante methodologies based on structural modeling and simulation: see Eissa and Liebman (1996) Bingley and Walker (1997) Eissa and Hoynes (2004) Duncan and Giles (1996) , Blundell et al. (2000) and Blundell et al. (2005) .
Recently France and the Netherlands also implemented measures aiming at 'making work pay', but contrary to the US and the UK, these countries opted for individualised tax credits, while Germany introduced a subsidy on social security contributions for individual earnings below a certain threshold. 4 Belgium, which has an almost fully individualised tax system and is progressively individualising its benefit system, also opted for individualised measures. In particular, the 2001 tax reform introduced a new individual tax credit on low earnings, while the 2004 reform replaced the tax credit with a significant increase in the subsidy to social security contributions paid by low wage employees.
The aim of this paper is to assess ex-ante and to compare the impact of the recent Belgian reforms on the labour supply of couples. 5 The reform has been so far analysed in its static dimension only. Valenduc (2002) and Cantillon et al.(2003) , for example, present a detailed analysis of the distribution of the gains and on how the progressiveness and redistribution power of the tax system is modified by the reform. Both papers, however, are silent about the employment effects or on how the structure of incentives is modified by the reform. Saintrain (2002) estimates the effect on employment using a demand driven macro-model. The main hypothesis is that the increase in net wages following the tax reform will be compensated by a reduction of gross wage. This outcome, however, appears unlikely given the automatic wage-indexation and the wage setting institutions in Belgium. Vermeulen (2006) develops a structural collective model of female labour supply and analyses the impact of the tax reform, but the analysis is limited to females in couple without children.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 1 describes the tax reform and the subsidy on social security contributions, section 2 presents the data, the microsimulation model and the econometric framework, section 3 presents the estimates of potential behavioral adjustments and conclusion.
THE TAX REFORM, THE TAX CREDIT AND WORKBONUS
In August 2001, the Belgian Parliament passed a Tax Reform bill, which implemented the fiscal reform announced by the federal government in its Federal Policy Plan of 17 th October 2000. The reform has been phased in progressively between 2001 and 2005. The tax reform was composed of a generalised tax reduction, more or less evenly distributed amongst taxpayers, and of a refundable earned income tax credit, which specifically targets individuals with low earnings -hereafter tax credit. 6 The other measures contained in the tax reform were: (i) the increase in deductions for working expenses; (ii) the broadening of the central tax brackets (those at 30 and 40%) and the reduction of the 50% tax bracket, by increasing the bottom bound; (iii) the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates (at 55%) and (iv) the alignment of the tax exempt income quotas for married couples to the same level of those for singles or cohabiting couples (from 3,250 EUR to 4,095 EUR). Table 1 gives further details on the elements of the reform.
The tax credit was introduced with the explicit aim of making employment financially more attractive, especially to youngsters and women, and -at the same time -redistributing income in an effort to reduce the poverty risk of low wage workers (Ministère de Finances, 2002 [Reynders, 2001, p.7] 7 Differently from the WFTC, the Belgian measure is a refundable tax credit; it is fully individualised and means-tested on the tax payer's earnings. 8 The credit is phased in from 0 to 506 EUR/year for earnings between 3,750 and 5,000 EUR/year and is phased out for earnings between 12,500 and 16,280 EUR/year. Moreover, eligibility is conditional on working at least 13 hours.
IS BELGIUM "MAKING WORK PAY"? 6 Crédit d'impôt pour les bas revenus d'activitée profesionnelle/Belastingkrediet voor lage inkomsten in French and Dutch respectively. 7 Translated from French. 8 Individualisation of the benefit implies, for example, that both members of a couple are potentially eligible and more importantly -the income of one partner has no effect on the eligibility of the other. The main drawback of the family based in work benefits (IWBs) is therefore avoided. On the other hand, the broad eligibility conditions imply that the benefit cannot be as generous as, for example, the WFTC. Also, differently from the WFTC, the tax credit is not scaled according to family conditions, so that the number of children is not taken into account. Such a feature may cause the benefit to be quite ineffective in tackling inactivity traps, since means-tested social assistance (MINIMEX, now RSI) is indeed scaled on household size. The ratio of income in employment to income out of work will therefore be higher for single women on social assistance than for single mothers.
One year before its full implementation, however, the tax credit was replaced by the Workbonus: a reduction of social security contributions levied on low wage workers. 9 The tax credit is, however, still working for self-employed, as the latter do not benefit from the reductions in social security contributions. 10 The workbonus builds on the previously existing system of employees' social security contributions (SSC) deductions for low skilled workers. The first reduction had been introduced in 1999. In 2001 it consisted of 81.8 EUR per month. Following the introduction of the new bonus, the reduction reached 140 EUR in 2006. The subsidy is phased out between 1,210 (the full-time minimum salary) and 2,000 EUR/month of full-time equivalent earnings. The appealing feature of the workbonus is its link with full-time equivalent earnings: gross earnings are first transformed in full-time equivalent, then the maximum reduction to which a worker might be entitled is computed and then again scaled to the amount of hours worked. This way, employees working fulltime are entitled to the full reduction, while part-time employees will only have a fraction of the maximum reduction (depending on the fraction of full-time they actually work).
Differently from the tax credit, the workbonus clearly distinguishes between low productivity (i.e. weak hourly wages) and low effort (i.e. short working time) and thus avoids the part-time premium implicit in the tax credit. Moreover, low wage workers benefit from the increase in net income immediately since social security contributions are directly levied by the employers.
11 This feature could theoretically lead employers to offer lower gross wages. However, as discussed in the introduction, this is highly unlikely given the functioning of the Belgian labour market. 
THE BUDGETARY COSTS OF THE REFORMS
The measures simulated in the present study represent the core of the tax reform (and they absorb around 85% of the estimated budgetary cost). Note that the cost of the reform, as well as the potential labour supply effects are estimated as if the reforms had been instantaneously implemented in 2001, thus neglecting the complexities linked with the progressive implementation of the different instruments between 2001 and 2006. Table 2 compares the official estimated budgetary cost of the planned personal income tax reform (based on the Ministry of Finance's microsimulation model SIRe) with the estimates produced by the tax benefit model Modété.
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Reform I refers to the initially planned personal income tax reform, i.e. the income tax reform including the tax credit on earned income, whereas reform II refers to the reform that was finally implemented by replacing the tax credit for employees with an increased subsidy on low wage workers' social security contributions, i.e. the workbonus. The workbonus is estimated to have a direct cost of around 600 millions Euros per year. This is not too far from the figure of 621 millions budgeted by the Minister of Employment. Lower social security contributions, however, imply higher taxable income, since the former are subtracted from gross income to get to taxable income. The loss on the social security budget is therefore partly compensated by a positive effect on tax revenue. The net cost of the workbonus is therefore estimated to be only 368 million Euros. The tax credit, on the other hand, has an estimated budgetary cost of costs about 423 millions. As a consequence of interactions of social security contributions and taxes, however, the two reforms are comparable in terms of net budgetary cost. The total simulated cost of reform I is 3,146 billions per year, while reform II would cost 3,149 billions per year. These figures are about 25% higher than the official estimates of the microsimulation model SIRe.
The biggest discrepancy, in relative terms, was due to the cost of the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates. 
13

HOUSEHOLD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE REFORM
The effect of the reforms on households' incentives to supply labour may best be understood by comparing pre-and post-reform budget constraints. KRISTIAN ORSINI 13 There are two tentative explanations for this: on the one hand, tax files may indeed underreport sources of income that are partially captured in income distribution surveys and on the other hand, households in the middle to upper part of the income distribution are usually able to deduct significant expenses (pension savings, health care, investments) that are captured by the microsimulation model SIRe, but not by Modété. Weekly hours worked (secondary earner) Net disposable income Figure 1 outlines the budget constraints for a single breadwinner couple (with no children) and for a two earner couple (with two children) working at the minimum wage (6.6 EUR/hour in 2001). In the first panel, gross earnings start from zero and increase linearly as the labour supply increases from 0 to 60 hours per week. In the second panel, the initial gross earnings correspond to the full-time gross earnings of the primary earner and the additional earnings correspond to the earnings of the secondary earner when his/her labour supply increases from 0 to 60 hours per week. In the case of the single breadwinner couple, the most striking feature is the flat segment that goes up to almost 28 hours worked per week. Indeed, the minimum income scheme, as it is means tested on net income, imposes an implicit tax rate on labour market income of almost 100%.
14 These pictures clearly shows that in complex tax and benefit environments, characterised by meantested income support schemes, reductions in the tax burden are not per se sufficient to modify the low skilled financial incentives to take up work.
Following reform I and reform II, the disposable income when working part-time is exactly the same as before the reform, which in turn is almost the same as the disposable income when not working at all. The reforms, however, clearly increase disposable income when working full-time.
For single breadwinner couple earning the minimum wage, the two reforms are almost similar when working full-time. Under reform I, however, there is a small kink in disposable income when working 3/4 of full-time. After this threshold, disposable income increases at a lower rate as the tax credit is tapered away, whereas with reform II income continues to increase linearly, given that the benefit is proportional to working time. The difference between the two reforms is also clear in the case of two earner households. Between 16 and 38 hours worked, disposable income is slightly higher under reform I. The two reforms are almost equivalent for low skilled workers when working full-time, while the second reform is more beneficial when working over-time.
For hourly wages above the minimum wage, the tax credit creates an unambiguous advantage when working less than full-time. In this case, the flat segment for single breadwinner households is shorter and the kink of the tax credit comes in at shorter working hours. For medium skilled people, there is therefore a clear advantage under the tax credit to work shorter hours. Under the workbonus scheme, on the other hand, the size of the subsidy gets smaller and smaller as the skill level increases, but it continues to be higher for longer working hours. This is clearly the case shown in figure 2, which depicts the case of a single breadwinner household and a couple working at 150% of the minimum wage.
Finally, figure 3 shows the case of a single breadwinner household and a couple earning a wage twice the minimum wage. In this case, reform I still creates an incentive to work part-time. The workbonus, on the other hand, does not affect these workers, since their full-time equivalent earnings are outside the benefit range. The second reform clearly distinguishes between low skill and low effort, whereas the tax credit is simply a transfer towards individuals with low earnings, irrespective of whether the latter are low skilled workers working full-time or medium to high skilled workers working shorter working hours. In general, reform I budget constraints are above reform II budget constraints in the range of part-time or marginal part-time, whereas the reverse happens as we approach full-time. The crossing point will depend on the level of the hourly wage. The analysis of the budget constraints of different household typologies already gives an idea of the possible effects of the reforms: in both cases there is a clear incentive for the less skilled to take up work. The tax credit, however, may push secondary earners to take up a parttime job, while the workbonus does not deliver an implicit part-time premium. Moreover, with the tax credit, workers already working full-time could decide to reduce their labour supply. In order to quantify these reactions, nevertheless, we need to develop a structural model of labour supply accounting for the full heterogeneity in preferences and in wage levels. This is done in the following section. 
FIGURE 2. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS -SINGLE BREADWINNER COUPLE (a) AND TWO EARNERS HOUSEHOLD WITH TWO CHILDREN (b) AT 150% OF MINIMUM WAGE
THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
To predict labour supply reactions, we use a structural supply-driven microeconomic model that fully exploits the heterogeneity of the working force in terms of their constraints (skill levels, household conditions, benefit entitlements, tax liabilities) and preferences.
The construction of such a model requires two building blocks: a microsimulation model capable of reconstructing the budget constraint of households and individuals, and an econometric model rationalising the observed behaviour. 
THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK AND THE DATA
Traditional approaches, based on the estimation of continuous labor supply functions, have proven computationally cumbersome even in the simplest case, let alone in the more complex cases in which multiple welfare programme participation, the social stigma of benefit take up and the fixed cost of labor supply are considered. The modelisation of labour supply behaviour has been greatly simplified by the discrete approach proposed by van Soest (1995) . The latter, in particular, builds on the observation that institutional constraints result in a limited set of working time alternatives (inactivity, some part-time categories, full-time and over-time), 15 significantly reducing the computational burden of the estimation.
Suppose that each partner in a couple may supply a finite number of working hours; each choice j=0,...,J of working hours of the partners corresponds to a given level of gross labour market income. After adding non labour income and applying the microsimulation model, we derive the set of disposable incomes C ij (we suppose here that choice j=0 corresponds to non-participation) and each discrete bundle of leisure and income provides a different level of utility.
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In order to correctly capture the difference between the two reforms, we assumed that each partner may work 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 hours, but for sensitivity analysis, we also estimated a model with non participation, part-time and full-time only (i.e. 0, 20 and 40 hours). With 6 labour supply points (D=6), a couple chooses amongst 36 alternatives, whereas with 3 labour supply points (D=3) there are only 9 alternatives.
17
Each alternative is characterized by a triplet of disposable income, leisure of the female partner and leisure of the male partner. The model is based on random utility: the utility household i derives from making choice j,V ij , corresponds to the sum of the deterministic part of utility U ij , which is assumed to depend on a function of spouses' leisure Lf j , Lm j , 18 disposable income C ij and household characteristics Z i , and of a random term ε ij , unknown to the econometrician: KRISTIAN ORSINI 15 The approach may, however, also be extended to almost continuous labour supply by increasing the number of alternatives; see van Soest et al. (2002) . 16 The term leisure should be interpreted as non labor market time. 17 Hours worked were censored at 80 hours per week and discretised according to the following rules for D=6 and 18 The latter are defined respectively as 80 Hmj and 80 Hfj, where Hfj, Hmj are the hours worked by the female and the male partner respectively. 
If the error term ε ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across alternatives and households according to a extreme value distribution (Extreme ValueType I), McFadden (1974) proves that the probability that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by:
Conditional on a functional specification of the utility function, it is possible to estimate the preference parameters. In the following, we assume a quadratic specification of the utility function, as in Blundell et al. (2000) :
We allow preferences to vary across households through taste-shifters on the income and leisure coefficients:
where X c , X lf and X lm are vectors of observed heterogeneity (age, number and age of children).
The data comes from the most recent wave of the PSBH (Panel Survey of Belgian Households), i.e. the 11th wave collected in 2001 and containing information on the incomes of year 2000. The survey covers about 7,000 individuals living in approximately 3,000 households. Unfortunately after the 11th wave the survey was interrupted, so that it will not be possible to assess the reform ex-post using techniques based on microdata (e.g. difference in differences).
19 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the population in working age (25 to 60) and of the modeled households. We modeled only households where both partners are available for the labour market, i.e. not disabled, not retired or pre retired and not in full-time education. Households where only one member is available for the labour market should in fact be modeled separately, using a model which only endogenises the labour supply of the partner available for the labour market. Unfortunately the number of households belonging to this group (332), just like the number of lone fathers lone mothers, singles males and single females (820 in total), was too small and too heterogenous to obtain reliable estimates of a labour supply model. 
IS BELGIUM "MAKING WORK PAY"?
19 Ideally the panel nature of the dataset could be used to introduce a further sophistication in the model, that is control for fixed effects in the preference structure. There are however several complications with such an approach. Firstly it requires simulating the baseline legislation for each of the years of the panel and it also requires a dataset with low attrition (which is not the case for the PSBH). More fundamentally the complexities arising when applying structural discrete models to panel data have not yet been completely solved (see Haan, 2005 ).
We also excluded from the sample the self employed: the lack of information on their labour supply hinders the estimation of a model. Following this selection procedure, we are able to model about 2/3 of the adult population. The neglect of a significant part of the active population may lead to underestimate the effect on the aggregate labour supply. However, on the one hand, one of the main components of the reform, i.e. the increase in the tax exempted quota, only affects married couples and, on the other hand, the labour supply elasticities of singles tend to be smaller than those of females in couples (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) . In order to simulate the budget constraint of each household, Modété needs as input the gross labour income at different hours worked. The standard hypothesis is that the hourly wage is fixed, so that gross labour income corresponds to gross hourly wage times the amount of hours worked. The gross hourly wage is derived for all employees by dividing the gross monthly wage by the number of hours worked per month. We then still have to impute a wage rate for inactive and unemployed workers. For this purpose the hourly wage was first estimated (separately for males and females) on the whole sample of individuals in working age (employed, unemployed or inactive) using a Heckman correction model. The exclusion criterion was the employment status of the male and the regional unemployment rate for females and the regional unemployment rate for males. 20 For males, the Heckman correction model did not provide evidence of a significant selection bias. This result is consistent with results in other countries, showing that the selection bias is more pronounced for females than for males (Choudhuri, 1993) . We also included two regional dummy variables in the wage equation. These dummies are assumed to capture differences in the local labour markets other than the unemployment rate that affecting the wage level. Estimates of the wage equations are presented in table 4. Coefficients all have the expected sign, and the inverse Mill's ratio (lambda) hints at a significant selection bias for females, also confirmed by the likelihood ratio test. In particular, the constant for female wage is somewhat lower than that of males, while the effects of schooling and potential experience have a similar order of magnitude. The prediction error is measured by the root of the mean squared error ( 3 / 4 in the table), and -as expected -is slightly larger for females than for males. The errors are, nevertheless, in the order of magnitude of other recent studies (Laroque and Salanie, 2002) .
For each of the two discretisations (D=3 and D=6), we estimated two models. In the first one, we only used the predicted wage for households where one or both partners were out of employment. Following van Soest (1995), we also estimate a second model which explicitly accounts for the fact that unobserved wages are predicted with an error (which we might call unobserved productivity).
When the distribution of the unobserved productivity term is known, the problem may be solved by integrating the likelihood function over the density of the unobserved productivity term. An alternative, however, is to use simulated maximum likelihood. 21 We proceeded by drawing random terms from the error distribution of the male and female wage equations whenever the wage was imputed and by computing the corresponding set of disposable incomes, using the microsimulation model. The individual contributions to likelihood were then replaced by their average taken over the R simulated values of the error term (in our case we used 20 independent draws from the gender specific wage distribution) and the corresponding hourly wages w mr ;w fr : (5) The term C ij (w fr ;w mr ) clarifies that the disposable incomes are a function of the wage rates of the male and female in the couple. Conditional on the specification of the functional form, equation (2) or equation (5) allow to estimate the parameters of equation (2). The parameters for the model with and without unobserved random productivity are shown in tables 5 and 6, for D = 3 and D = 6 respectively. The model with just inactivity/unemployment, part-time and full-time, produced a relatively good fit of the data. The second discretisation, on the other hand, did not produce an acceptable fit of the data. Discrete models of labour supply tend to face difficulties in fitting the observed distribution of working hours, especially in the case of less frequent working time opportunities. A typical way of overcoming this limitation is introducing in equation (5) alternative specific dummies which supposedly account for higher search costs or different characteristics of jobs with non standard working requirements (van Soest, 1995) . KRISTIAN ORSINI 209 21 This approach turns out to be quite convenient whenever integration over unobserved individual heterogeneity (in this case in the wage level) does not yield a closed form.
The derivatives with respect to leisure show that, for a significant share of the population, positive monotonicity in leisure is not respected. As stressed by Euwals and van Soest (1999) , there is no necessity to restrict preferences relative to the taste for leisure. With respect to income, however, preferences are well behaved, and no restriction had to be imposed in the estimation. Note that integrating an additional unobserved productivity term increased the likelihood of the model for both discretisations. We therefore retain in the following sections this specification, although arguably, the more sophisticated model did not radically change the pattern of the coefficients.
Note that the coefficients in the two tables are not strictly comparable -since additional alternative specific dummies were introduced in the model with D = 6. Moreover, the coefficients in the table are difficult to interpret, given the non linearity of the model. An alternative way to look at the different specification is to compare the labour supply elasticities as derived by the different specifications. This is done in the following section.
TABLE 5. ESTIMATES OF PREFERENCE STRUCTURE (MODEL I: D=3)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES
In the current section, we shortly investigate the labour supply elasticities. This was done by first calibrating the model on the observed labour supply in the baseline scenario. Calibration consists in drawing sets of random utility terms ε ij from the relevant distribution (extreme value). According to the discretisation, a set of either 9 or 36 randomly drawn ε ij is retained if -when added to the corresponding U ij -it yields a set of V ij , whose maximum value is V ik whenever household i is observed having chosen k. Such a calibration was performed 100 times. We then recompute the set of disposable incomes after increasing by 1% the gross wages of the female and the male partners, and recompute the structural utility term U ik . The latter is simply obtained by introducing the new vector of disposable incomes in equation (3). After adding the random utility terms, we obtain 100 sets of V ij . In each set, the maximum value V ik represents the new optimal labour supply. By averaging up over the 100 sets of draws, we derive the household's labour supply following the wage increase.
Bootstrapped median value and confidence intervals are obtained by drawing 100 times from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated coefficients and re-calibrating for each draw. In table 7 the column "Hours" shows the aggregate labour supply elasticities (i.e. the expected relative change in labour supply, following an increase in the gross hourly wage). This elasticity therefore includes changes of labour supply both at the intensive and at the extensive margins. The column "Part.", on the other hand, shows the percentage change in the participation probability. The two discretisations give similar labour supply elasticities, proving the robustness of the model with respect to alternative specifications of the working opportunities. Female and male labour supply elasticities were estimated at .232 and .115 respectively with D=3 and .250 and .141 with D=6. On average, female elasticities are higher than male elasticities, the confidence interval partially overlaps in the model with D=6, but not in the model with D=3. Orsini (2005) estimated labour supply elasticities for females in couples. The estimated elasticity is slightly higher, but well within the confidence interval (.270); the model used in Orsini (2005) , moreover, is partially different as female labour supply is modeled according to a male chauvinist framework, assuming male labour supply as fixed. Overall, elasticities are small and mostly driven by changes in the participation rate (both for males and for females) rather than by changes at the intensive margin. 
LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES
The same methodology used for computing average aggregate elasticities and their confidence intervals, may be used to compute the expected labour supply effects following the change in the tax and benefit environment, simply by replacing the set of pre-reform disposable incomes with the set of disposable incomes after reform I and reform II. The net increases in participation and working hours (in Full Time Equivalent -FTE) are shown in table 8, and refer to the model with D=6. 22 The table shows the employment effect and the hours effect. The employment effect is the change in the number of participants, the hours effect is the change in total number of hours supplied (including the participation effect), weighted with the sample weights scaled up to the size of the Belgian population in 2001. In order to make this last figure more understandable and comparable, however, the change in hours supplied is expressed in full-time Equivalents (FTE) positions. The total change in hour supply, moreover, is disaggregated in two components: the change in hours work of the population already in employment, and the change in hours work of the population out of work in the pre-reform scenario. As we will see, this decomposition is particularly useful to explore the effects of the two different reforms.
The table shows the cumulate effect of all measures. We started by introducing the tax credit and the workbonus to stress the difference between the two instruments. We then introduced, in the following order, the increase in the flat-rate deduction for working expenses, the broadening of the central tax brackets, the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates and the alignment of tax exempt income quotas.
The two reforms have a comparable effect on aggregate labour supply. According to our methodology, we may expect an additional 23,729 FTE positions under reform I (almost equally distributed between females -13,424 FTE -and males -10,305 FTE) and about 26,520 additional FTE positions under reform II (15,118 for females and 11,402 FTE for males).
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The first thing to notice is that the two measures have statistically significantly different effects:
24 reform I has a stronger impact than reform II on the participation level of females (+1715 additional units); while reform II has a stronger impact on both male and female labour supply (+1248 and +1963 FTE respectively). The tax credit has a larger effect on the participation of females. The latter measure only is responsible for a growth in participation of 6,055 units. However, several of the new participants are working part-time or less than part-time, as witnessed by the number of new FTE positions (+4,652). Moreover, as expected from the analysis of the budget constraints, several women in couple would reduce their labour supply to enter the eligibility area: the reduction of labour supply amongst females who were employed before the reform corresponds to 1,944 FTE positions, so that the net effect of the tax credit is just about 2,793 FTE positions. For males the situation is radically different: after the tax credit participation increases by 1978 units only, and by 2,665 FTE positions amongst the previously inactive, meaning that almost all people that start working do so at full-time or over-time. There is also a reduction of labour supply amongst males, but the latter is almost exclusively driven by the reduction in hours supplied of males working fulltime or over-time.
This confirms the initial intuition about the tax credit: the tax credit on low earnings is indeed a premium to part-time. It encourages the participation of inactive females, for whom the cost of working part-time is smaller, but it also encourages working females and working males to reduce their labour supply. Moreover, the premium to work part-time is especially convenient for the medium skilled. The low skilled do not get the maximum benefit from working part-time. The workbonus, on the other hand, is perfectly targeted to the low skilled. Moreover the full subsidy is granted when working full-time, but a fraction of the subsidy is granted when working part-time. The impact on the participation of previously inactive females is therefore considerably lower (+4,347), but those who start working are now pushed into full employment, and not into part-time or marginal part-time. In terms of FTE, in fact, labour supply increases by 3,962 positions. Most noticeable is the fact that the workbonus has no negative effect on females already in employment. For males the tax credit and the workbonus have almost the same effect on participation. This is not very surprising: given the high cost of working part-time, males have a high preference for working full-time or over-time. When working full-time, however, the tax credit is only of advantage to the low skilled, i.e. the same population targeted by the workbonus. Moreover, as shown by the budget constraints, when working full-time (or around full-time), the difference between the tax credit and the workbonus is minimal. The tax credit and the workbonus, however, differ substantially by their effect on the population already in employment. The reduction in labour supply is only minimal for males , whereas for females it actually increases, even at the intensive margin (+536 FTE positions).
The other measures have a similar impact on labour supply, irrespective of their interaction with the tax credit and the workbonus. In order to assess the effect on the labour supply of a single measure, it is possible to subtract the cumulated effect excluding the specific measure to assess, from the cumulated effect including the measure. 25 The broadening of the central tax brackets has the second strongest effect on participation of females, after the tax credit and the workbonus (almost +4,300 positions in both cases). In the case of males the effect is somewhat smaller (about 3,000 new entrants).
The most important measure for the participation of males is the alignment of tax exempted quotas of married men and women to the level of singles or cohabiting couples -indeed the most expensive measure of the tax reform. Participation of both males and females is expected to increase by almost 4,000 units (males working on average full-time, but females working on average 3/4 of full-time). In both cases, the latter measures have no negative effects on the labour supply of the population already in employment.
A measure that is expected to have a negative impact on the labour supply of males, however, is the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates. The income effect, in this case, dominates the substitution effect, since an increase in the net wages of high income males actually produces a decrease in their labour supply. The reduction in aggregate labour supply and in participation is minimal (around 700 males exit the labour market), but nevertheless significant. This result shows that little or no increase in labour supply can be expected in Belgium from cutting top marginal tax rates. This result is consistent with the simulations of Aaberge et al. (2004) , who also expect negative labour supply responses from a reduction of the average tax rate for the highest income deciles.
Finally, it is interesting to compute the cost per additional participant and per additional FTE unit. This is obtained by dividing the net budgetary cost (before behavioural reactions) by the number of additional workers entering activity or the number of FTE units. Under reform I, the cost per additional participant and per additional FTE unit is in the order of 125,000 and 145,000 EUR per year respectively, whereas under reform II, both are in the order of 130,000 -given that the number of additional participants almost coincide with the number of additional FTE units. Again, it should be remembered that we only model couples. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude is similar to that of other "making work pay" policies, thus confirming the high cost of stimulating labour supply via the tax and benefit system. It should, however, be mentioned that, besides stimulating labour supply, tax and benefit reforms might have other aims which are not considered in the current paper.
CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates the impact of the Belgian 2001 tax reform using a discrete model of labour supply. The reform was supposed to be implemented gradually over 4 years. In 2004, however, the workbonus replaced the tax credit on low earnings. The workbonus reform was fully implemented in 2006.
TABLE 8. CUMULATIVE EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS EFFECT OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL REFORMS RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED IN BELGIUM
The difference between the two reforms, once considering all the interactions of the tax credit and the workbonus with the other instruments, is not extremely pronounced. Nevertheless, as denounced by De Callataÿ (2002), the tax credit would have delivered a premium to part-time workers, and induced some full-time workers (mainly females) to reduce their labour supply.
26 This is no longer the case with the workbonus, given that eligibility is conditional on the hourly wage (i.e. full-time equivalent earnings). At the same time, however, the tax credit would have induced a higher participation, at least amongst females in couples. With the workbonus, on the other hand, the increase in income when working part-time is visibly not sufficient to induce women into employment. Moreover, several females that would have been eligible for the tax credit when working part-time, are too skilled to be eligible to the workbonus.
Policymakers thus preferred a measure aimed at increasing full-time participation amongst a sub-population of low wage, to a measure that had the merit of activating a higher number of individuals, especially females in couples, pushing them to work part-time or marginal part-time.
Important increases in labour supply are also induced by the other measures included in the tax reform. Especially the increase of the tax exempted quota for married couples and the broadening of the central tax brackets. The abolition of the highest marginal tax rates, on the other hand, had a negative effect on the labour supply of males in couples, and only a weak effect on the labour supply of females.
APPENDIX
Modété was constructed at the Department of Applied Economics of the ULB (Dulbéa) as the Belgian module of the EU integrated microsimulation model EUROMOD (see Joyeux (1999) and Immervoll, O'Donoghue, and Sutherland (1999) ). The model currently runs on the 1998 and the 2001 waves of the Panel Survey of Belgian Households (PSBH), which is the Belgian survey for the ECHP, and simulates the tax and benefit legislation for the years 1998-2005. The model relies on information from gross labour income and replacement incomes. Since wages and replacement incomes are reported net of taxes and SSC in the survey, the microsimulation model was first applied backwards to obtain the gross income components. Figure 4 graphically presents the structure of Modété. The grey income components are taken directly from the data, whereas the shaded grey income components are simulated by the model. The white items, on the other hand, are neglected. The model simulates (in the following order) SSC of employer, self employed and employees (net of SSC reductions for low wage workers), the deduction of professional expenses, personal income taxes (including the separate taxation of real estate income and income from financial assets), the tax credit on low earned income, child benefits, minimum income for households in working age and minimum income for the elderly. 
